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A ROLE IN THE REMEDY: FINDING A PLACE
FOR ISPS IN THE DIGITAL MUSIC WORLD
Joseph Merante *
Recent discussions of platform parity and three-strikes laws support
the inevitability that Internet Service Providers ("ISPs")' will need to play
a role in the licensing, collection, and enforcement of digital music
royalties.2 Identifying the proper role of ISPs as part of a collective
licensing model has the potential to push the dial much closer toward a
uniform system for dealing with copyrighted music as 1 's and O's ("bits"),
3
rather than context-specific sides of the §106 4 dice. Properly addressing
issues such as subscriber privacy, network neutrality, and infringement
enforcement can lead to a fair solution for copyright owners, digital music
service providers, ISPs, and fans.
"ISP" is used throughout as shorthand, but is meant to apply to any
entity whose network is used to transmit music as bits.5 According to
Informa, a market-research firm, mobile spending on content and data
outpaced spending on handsets for the first time in 2008.6 EU
Commissioner Viviane Reding recently discussed this trend and noted that
2009 is expected to see three quarters of the planet's population having a
mobile handset.7 She goes on to comment that the diffusion rate of mobile
* J.D. Candidate, New York Law School, 2010; B.A., Berklee College of Music, 2005. The
author would like to thank the Grammy Foundation for this opportunity. Runner-up in The
GRAMMY Foundation®'s 11 th Annual Entertainment Law Initiative Writing Competition.
1. Internet service provider, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet-service-provider (last
visited June 14, 2009).
2. Kevin C. Parks, Black Hole or Celestial Jukebox? Section 114 and the Future of Music,
1.2 A.B.A. SEC. OF INTELL. PROP. LANDSLIDE 46 (2008); Mathew Ingram, RIAA Drops Lawsuit
Strategy for "Three Strikes" Plan, GIGAOM, Dec. 19, 2008, http://gigaom.com/2008/12/19/riaa-
drops-lawsuit-strategy-for-three-strikes-plan/.
3. See, e.g., HAL ABELSON ET. AL., BLOWN TO BITS: YOUR LIFE, LIBERTY, AND HAPPINESS
AFTER THE DIGITAL EXPLOSION 1 (2008).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (defining the exclusive rights in copyrighted works).
5. See, e.g., ABELSON ET. AL., supra note 3, at 1.
6. The Battle for the Smart-Phone's Soul, ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 2008, at 76.
7. Viviane Reding, Member of the European Comm'n for Info. Soc'y and Media, Speech at
European Internet Foundation: Digital Europe: The Internet Mega-trends that Will Shape
Tomorrow's Europe (Nov. 13, 2008).
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technologies has been faster than even pen and paper in terms of
penetration, use, and speed of take-up. 8 A simplified collective licensing
system with a central role for ISPs will allow new business models to
flourish in an "innovate first, make adjustments later" balance rather than
the current "permission first, innovation later." 9  Two authors recently
noted, "it has proven impossible to make significant technological leaps,
and yet take backward steps as far as users rights are concerned." ' 0
I. A QUICK CASE FOR COLLECTIVE LICENSING
Some say that the recent experimentation in the marketplace is
pointing in the right direction. " But how much longer does the public
need to wait for results? According to Warner executive Jim Griffin,
"collective licensing is what people do when they lose control, or when
control is no longer practical or efficient." 2 Rather than copyright owners
continuing a technological arms race, 13 streamlining the royalty process
through collective licensing should encourage competition. It should be
simple enough to organize an opt-in effort from copyright owners, as the
combined efforts of all industry players, not to mention the extensive media
coverage that would result, would provide low-cost yet ubiquitous
notification. 14 This may also aid in the claiming of orphan works. It
would be simpler to just make the license compulsory to avoid the
difficulty of sorting out contractual claims or renegotiating them. 15 In any
event, an automated submission process can be established for copyright
owners to register their works with the appropriate databases, similar to the
8. Id.
9. Fred Von Lohmann, How Hollywood Has Been Trying to Disrupt Disruptive Innovation,
EETIMES, http://www.eetimes.com/disruption/essays/vonlohmann.jhtml (last visited Mar. 12,
2009) [hereinafter Von Lohmann, Hollywood].
10. DAVID KUSEK & GERD LEONHARD, THE FUTURE OF MUSIC: MANIFESTO FOR THE
DIGITAL REVOLUTION 33 (2005).
11. Posting of Greg Sandoval to CNET News Blog, Jim Griffin Says ISP Music Tax Only
One Possibility, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9905952-7.html (Mar. 29, 2008, 06:00 PST)
(Mitch Bainwol, chairman and CEO of the RIAA, noting that "There's a lot of experimentation in
the marketplace right now and that's ultimately a good thing for the industry and for fans").
12. Sam Gustin, Fee for All, CONDt NAST PORTFOLIO, Mar. 27, 2008,
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/top-5/2008/03/27iWamers-New-Web-Guru.
13. See KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 10, at 96 (noting that a technological arms race by
copyright owners against determined programmers would be futile at best).
14. Posting of Fred von Lohmann to EFF Deeplinks Blog, Monetizing File-Sharing:
Licensing Good, ISP Tax Bad, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/03/monetizing-file-sharing-
collective-licensing-good-isp-tax-bad (Mar. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Von Lohmann, Monetizing].
15. See Reinhardt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d 346, 354 (S.D.N.Y 2008).
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way many large companies currently do. 16
Author's Guild board member James Gleick said, "[i]t is significant
that one says book lover and music lover and art lover but not record lover
or CD lover or, conversely, text lover." 17 Is the U.S. ready to recognize a
new right for "all things digital"? Creative Commons and the Open Source
movement have shown that similar results can be achieved within the
existing framework. 18 Whether classified as an "online use" fee or
"access" right, 19 the overall theme is that we are pushing toward a unified
digital right. Rights holders need to recognize that as the term of copyright
has been continuously extended, there must be a concomitant change in the
scope of that protection because as it stands, everything you do on the
internet creates a copy.20
In order to effectively implement an online monitoring scheme that
focuses on whether a work is "used" or "accessed," RAM and buffer copies
should first be treated as merely ephemeral and viewed as not meeting the
transitory duration requirement necessary to constitute "fixation.'
Similarly, courts are in conflict over whether "making available"
constitutes an act of distribution.22 The passage of the Digital Rights in
Sound Recordings Act (DPRSRA), which required payment for digital
audio transmissions of sound recordings (a historically physical product)
and extended the mechanical license to digital phonorecord deliveries
16. Audible Magic, Content Registration Customers, http://audiblemagic.com/clients-
partners/registration. asp (last visited Jan. 1, 2009).
17. James Gleick, Op-Ed., How to Publish Without Perishing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008,
at WK1O.
18. Open Source Initiative, The Open Source Definition,
http://www.opensource.org/docs/osd (last visited Jun. 14, 2009); Creative Commons, About
Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
19. See Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development
of an Access Right in US. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 113, 113 (2003); Posting of
Greg Sandoval to CNET News Blog, supra note 11.
20. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY
108, 135 (2005).
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2007) (defining "fixation"); compare Cartoon Network LP, LLLP
v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a 1.2-second buffer
copy did not constitute "fixation" of more than a transitory duration required to create a "copy"),
with MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
temporary storage as RAM was a "copy" for purposes of the Copyright Act). A full discussion of
this issue and the related issue of"incidental" DPDs and the Copyright Office's ringtone decision
is beyond the scope of this article.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2007); compare London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe, 542 F. Supp. 2d
153, 166 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that "making available" did not constitute distribution), with
Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F.Supp.2d 234, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying
defendant's motion for summary judgment based on plaintiffs infringement claims, and
remanding to enable plaintiff to modify its "making available" allegation).
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("DPDs"), demonstrates the inevitability of both the reproduction and
distribution rights becoming inseparable from the public performance
right.23
Current rates for "bits" uses vary considerably along with the
procedures for their determination.24 Uniformity of these rates would be
necessary for implementation of a collective licensing scheme, and
whatever mechanism is chosen to determine an aggregate "online use fee"
could take into account the rights of reproduction, distribution, and public
performance rather than waiting for legislative or judicial guidance. This
uniformity would also likely lessen the need to distinguish between types
of service providers, resulting in existing business models' licensing
schemes being folded into the collective licensing apparatus. As new
models and uses develop, there will be uniform procedures in place to fit
them into the new infrastructure, in which ISPs would play the central role.
II. SECTION 512, ANONYMITY, AND OTHER CONCERNS
ISPs would certainly not want to sacrifice any of their existing
Section 512 immunity by participating in data collection or enforcement at
the direction of third parties. 25 Immunity could perhaps be extended so
that an ISP's identification of transmitted copyrighted works would
explicitly not be a "modification" of the transmission's content.26 Also,
additional mechanisms to explicitly immunize ISPs for participation can be
put into place, similar to existing notification, "reasonable
implementation," and takedown processes.27 While voluntary cooperation
amongst copyright owners and ISPs has some potential, explicit statutory
immunities are necessary to reduce transaction costs and ensure
participation by ISPs. 28  Users would not be affected, as they would
embrace the newfound assurance that their online music activities are
legitimate. 29 Copyright owners would benefit from larger quantities of
23. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
24. Parks, supra note 2, at 49 (discussing royalty rates for different uses of music and
providing overview of variations in 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) Copyright Royalty Board proceedings).
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2007).
26. See id. § 512(b)(2)(A).
27. See id. §§ 512(c)(3), 512(c)(1)(C).
28. Christian L. Castle & Amy E. Mitchell, What's Wrong With ISP Music Licensing?, 26.3
A.B.A. ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 4, 7 (2008).
29. Fred von Lohmann, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music
File Sharing, EFF WHITEPAPER SERIES (Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.eff.org/files/eff-a-better-
way-forward.pdf, at 5 [hereinafter Von Lohmann, A Better Way].
2009] FINDING A PLACE FOR ISPS IN THE DIGITAL MUSIC WORLD 391
higher quality data, leading to more and better accounting. 
30
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) may be correct in asserting
that any proposed blanket fee paid by users to their ISPs should be
voluntary and not simply an "ISP tax" on all users. 31 An opt-out user
registration system would be similarly unfair. An opt-in system would
likely be much more effective and respectful of subscriber freedoms.32
Giving users the benefit of the doubt that they will voluntarily pay the fee
will go a long way in repairing the general perception that copyright
owners are out to exploit users.33 This may move us toward the reality that
the creative industries rely on clearly defined rights and responsibilities for
copyright owners, intermediaries, and users.
A pre-registration system can be set up and put into place after a
predetermined number of users have opted in. For example, if Grandma
has not opted in, but Little Johnny uses her account to access music, a
simple notification can be sent instead of a lawsuit. A system similar to
France's or the RIAA's "three-strikes" approach seems reasonable in light
of the ease of access, interoperability, and portability of music that would
be made available by a collective licensing model.34 This "three-strikes"
model would have to include built-in dispute resolution mechanisms and
should only terminate a user's service after extensive compliance efforts. 35
ISPs should be able to contact users about changes to the law and
their Terms of Service inexpensively by emailing users or notifying them in
their bills that each user is required to go online and sign a "clickwrap"
agreement if they wish to comply with the new collective licensing
model. 36 To kill two birds with one stone, included in this clickwrap
agreement could be an indemnification of the ISP from claims related to
disclosure of subscriber information or the contents of communications so
that the ISPs come under the consent exceptions to the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA").3 7 Any legislation creating a
30. Contra Castle & Mitchell, supra note 28.
31. Von Lohmann, Monetizing, supra note 14.
32. Von Lohmann, A Better Way, supra note 29, at 5.
33. Id. at 1; see, e.g., Ingram, supra note 2.
34. See Ingram, supra note 2.
35. See id.
36. See Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)
(holding a clickwrap agreement enforceable after user was presented with opportunity to scroll
through terms); but see Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff'd, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a "browsewrap" agreement in a hard-to-
find hyperlink did not provide sufficient notice and was thus unenforceable).
37. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986) (the relevant exceptions are contained within Title I, which amends the Wiretap Act, 18
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collective licensing system should also eliminate any notice-based liability
for ISPs' implementation of the plan. 38
Anonymous monitoring and reporting should be enough to squelch
privacy concerns 39 and allow a three-strikes type rule. Fears that
encryption by users or providers could stymie monitoring of ISPs are not
unfounded.40 But there would be no incentive to encrypt music data in the
first place if its transfer were legal. Leaving issues of code as speech aside,
the designated collection agents would have to implement enforcement and
investigation efforts against any latent digital underground. Existing
processes for obtaining IP addresses of those found to be transferring
encrypted copyrighted music without authorization should be sufficient,
provided there is legislative clarity on whether the designated collection
entities are considered to be private or government entities. This will
eliminate confusion over methods for release of subscriber information or
the contents of communications under ECPA. 4'
III. COMPETITION, COMPLIANCE, AND OPEN ACCESS
While some have suggested competition amongst collecting
societies, 42 this ideal presumes uniformity in data collection, technical
standards, and the like. This is not today's reality. Simply having two
designated collection agents, one for sound recording owners and
performers, and one for musical works owners, will lead to efficient
development of technical standards and business practices. In addition, the
foundation will be laid for future platform parity as the sampling, licensing,
and audit mechanisms will be in place to manage "bits" uses of music.
Many complain, understandably, that even with YouTube's current
licensing deals to monitor user-generated videos for music and pay labels,
no label statements have included "YouTube" monies. Open access to
data in standardized file formats at all points in future processes will allow
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, and Title II, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711).
38. See cases cited supra note 36.
39. Von Lohmann, A Better Way, supra note 29, at 5.
40. See Chris Williams, Surge in encrypted torrents blindsides record biz, THE REGISTER,
Nov. 8, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/11/08/bittorrent-encryption-explosion/.
41. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986) (the relevant exceptions are contained within Title I, which amends the Wiretap Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, and Title II, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711).
42. Von Lohmann, Monetizing, supra note 14.
43. Posting of Greg Sandoval to CNET News Blog, Musicians Still Waiting on a YouTube
Payday, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9887167-7.html (Mar. 6, 2008 04:00 PST) (noting
how artists are not getting YouTube money in their royalty statements).
2009] FINDING A PLACE FOR ISPS IN THE DIGITAL MUSIC WORLD 393
completely transparent auditing by copyright owners and ISP subscribers.
In addition, open access will ensure fair accounting to copyright owners in
the first place. Nevertheless, automated systems to notify the designated
agents of missing payments or unauthorized uses, and for lesser-known
artists to report activity, will need to be in place.
ISP subscribers and others can use available tools like the EFF's
Switzerland open source application to assess the integrity of ISP
monitoring.44 Antitrust considerations will have to be addressed as with
the American Soceity of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP)
and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) on the musical works side. On the sound
recordings side, the scope of SoundExchange's existing authority would
seem to support their designation. 4
Of course, the ISPs's role would warrant a percentage fee payment, to
be used for investment in network capacity and to pay for up-to-date
content identification and monitoring technologies. Perhaps a statutorily
defined future evaluation of whether there should be competition amongst
collection entities is warranted. For now, open and transparent access to
standardized data would enable plenty of opportunities for new business
models based on tracking, comparing, reporting, presentation, etc. One can
imagine an iPhone application that alerts you when an open access
reporting of a music use happens, or similarly when royalty money is
deposited into your bank account! Similarly, services such as MP3.com's
"locker" will be able to reemerge.
46
Having ISPs monitor both the sending and receipt of music packets
will eliminate disputes over which ISP has what responsibilities at what
point. Deep packet inspection and/or forged packets may be problematic, 
47
but neutrality fears can be minimized provided that any practice is
disclosed to users,48 is completely anonymous, and ISPs change their
44. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Switzerland Network Testing Tool,
http://www.eff.org/testyourisp/switzerland (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
45. SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
46. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that a third party Internet service which allowed users to listen to uploaded music from
CDs from anywhere they have an Internet connection violated existing copyright laws).
47. Deep Packet Inspection, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep-packet-inspection (last
visited Jan. 2, 2009).
48. In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications Broadband Industry Practices
Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application
Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for "Reasonable
Network Management, Memorandum Opinion and Order, File No. EB-08-IH-1518, WC Docket
No. 07-52 1 (2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-08-
183A1.pdf.
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Terms of Service accordingly. After an initial period of spiked usage,
levels of usage would normalize. A similar cycle would be seen if the ISP
role were to also include monitoring for movies or other copyrighted
works. Despite the necessity of network maintenance and management,
user privacy in an increasingly vulnerable digital world militates in favor of
content and bandwidth neutrality. Hence, ISPs must resist the temptation
to turn their proposed information-monitoring role into a backdoor to
charging high-volume users on a metered basis.
A mix of anonymous monitoring and sampling would work best. 49
Only in the case of unauthorized transfers should user identity be recorded
and/or disclosed (and only after three strikes). Aggregating data from
every layer in the TCP/IP stack 50 will lead to greater accuracy. For
example, at the application layer, the iTunes setup assistant that currently
notifies users that "Apple does not keep any information related to the
contents of your music library," 51 would need to change into "Apple
anonymously samples and reports the contents of your music library." A
reporting effort using audio fingerprinting technologies such as
AudibleMagic's CopySense, anonymous P2P monitoring with
BigChampagne, anonymous monitoring by digital-music-providers, and
Nielsen-like sampling would almost be enough. An ISP's uniquely central
and neutral position will allow them to monitor all layers of the TCP/IP
stack, enabling the proper balance between sampling and per-track usage.
IV. EFFECTS ON THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
A collective licensing scheme involving ISPs would have some initial
effects on existing business models and types. The emergence of 360
deals, 52 CDBaby and similar sites, 53 and new uses including video game
licensing, suggest that copyright owners realize that selling content is just
one of many revenue streams. Perhaps digital stores would have to pay a
yearly fee to copyright owners in addition to their reporting functions in
order to operate in the future. While this could lead to accusations that
copyright owners are now "double dipping," there is nothing unusual about
49. Von Lohmann, A Better Way, supra note 29, at 3.
50. TCP/IP Model, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCP/IPmodel (last visited Dec. 28, 2008).
51. AppleInsider Staff, Apple Addresses iTunes "MiniStore" Privacy Concerns,
APPLEINSIDER, Jan. 18, 2006,
http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/06/01/18/apple-addresses-itunes-ministorei.privacy-concer
ns.html.
52. About.com, Music Careers, 360 Deals, http://musicians.about.com/od/ah/g/360deals.htm
(last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
53. See, e.g., About CD Baby, http://cdbaby.com/about (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
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a service paying to operate, and users paying a general fee for use. 5 This
scenario would be no different than broadcasters paying fees to transmit
copyrighted works, and users paying their cable providers for the service. 55
"Adapt or die" is the law governing the technology and internet
world, and now copyright owners must face the same reality as the digital
music services. 56 While iTunes could still operate as a store and enable a
P2P-like environment, it and other services would compete based on
promotions and giveaways, advertisements, sponsorship, recommendation
systems, and other social features.57  Two of Apple's recent patent
applications, one for a "Rewards System" and the other for "User Supplied
and Refined Tags" of content in online store communities, demonstrate
effective hedging. 58
Although the ISP serving as "the ultimate information intermediary"
could have the ripple effect of transforming the collection of royalties
online, this would still neither "plug the analog hole" nor establish royalties
for the transfer of music to other devices. Requiring a payment by device
makers to the newly created collection entities, perhaps by amending the
Audio Home Recording Act, 59 would address the latter concern. For
commercial public performances of streamed content, the restaurant or
other entity could deduct the musical works portion of their "ISP fee" from
their normal payments to BMI or ASCAP. Interoperability would emerge
as DRM disappears, open access and standards are embraced, and
"fingerprinting" technology becomes standardized. Current fair use or
liability for the creation of unauthorized derivative works would still apply,
although clearer standards will eventually need to be fleshed out in the
online context. 60
In addition, further exploration of the effects of a collective licensing
scheme in the international context would have to be explored. For
example, a World Trade Organization panel found 1998's Fairness in
Music Licensing Act, which exempted certain establishments from paying
public performance royalties, in violation of TRIPs. 6 1 In developing a
54. See LESSIG, supra note 20, at 61.
55. Id.
56. KuSEK& LEONHARD, supra note 10, at 44.
57. Von Lohmann, A Better Way, supra note 29, at 5.
58. U.S. Patent App. 20080077489 (published Mar. 27, 2008); U.S. Patent App.
20080091549 (published Sept. 29, 2006).
59. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (added
chapter 10, "Digital Audio Recording Devices and Media," to Title 17).
60. See generally Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 951 (2004).
61. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (Jun.
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collective rights paradigm in the United States for online uses, payments to
the designated societies could be made through existing international
affiliate agreements of these societies. Viviane Reding also called for
cooperation in convergence and harmonization of rights licensing across
borders.62
V. CONCLUSION
Once the digital market becomes streamlined and rights are defined,
methods for identifying and dealing with infringement will be less ad hoc.
Part of the failure of current efforts is an attempt to destroy infringement in
an effort to develop a legitimate market. 63  The market is there and
copyright owners have the greatest marketing opportunity ever.64
Technology will continue to develop, encryption will continue to
strengthen, and no matter what happens, there will always be a necessity
for some enforcement efforts. A collective licensing system that gives
users the benefit of the doubt will remove the public relations obstacles and
morality wars, allow companies to explore new opportunities without fear
of liability, and let the music industry focus on delivering quality music to
fans. Identifying the proper rights and responsibilities of ISPs as the
ultimate intermediaries is the first step toward uniform "music as bits" laws
and social norms that will establish the framework for the future of digital
music.
15, 2000).
62. Viviane Reding, Comm'r for Info. Soc'y and Media, Eur. Comm'n, Speech at Brussels
Publishers Forum: The Convergent Publisher-Print media in the Broadband Economy (Dec. 6,
2007).
63. See KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 10, at 103-04.
64. Id. at 101.
